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The Incentives of Australian Public Companies Lobbying Against 
Proposed Superannuation Accounting Standards 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The release of AASB 1028 Accounting for Employee Entitlements followed a period of 
intense lobbying and debate, resulting in a standard that contained significantly less stringent 
requirements than those proposed in the preceding exposure draft.  This paper examines the 
incentives for public companies to lobby on the proposals in ED 53 Accounting for Employee 
Entitlements for the recognition of superannuation commitments of Australian companies.  
First, it analyses written submissions of public companies to identify the relative importance 
of superannuation as opposed to other types of employee benefits, and to identify the issues 
within superannuation that were of particular concern.  Second, characteristics of lobbying 
companies are compared with non-lobbying companies to identify whether the types of 
arguments put by lobbyists are indicative of systematic differences between lobbying and 
non-lobbying companies.  It is found that companies responding to ED 53 were 
predominantly concerned with issues relating to defined benefit superannuation plans and the 
adverse effects of the proposals on income volatility.  Consistent with this, companies 
sponsoring defined benefit plans were more likely to lobby against the proposals.  Companies 
that chose to lobby were also larger in size and had higher income volatility than non-
lobbying companies.  The paper provides a mapping between the arguments used by 
lobbying companies and their economic characteristics and evidence that, at least in the case 
of superannuation issues, lobbying behaviour truthfully revealed the preferences of lobbyists.  
The findings differ from those of comparable U.S. studies, the most obvious reason for this 
being institutional differences.  This underscores the need to control for institutional 
differences and to exercise caution in generalising results across countries. 
1. Introduction 
The superannuation industry in Australia has exhibited rapid growth, with the total value of 
assets held in superannuation funds reaching $377 billion at the end 1998.1  The sheer size of 
the industry alone makes accounting for superannuation an important issue.  To date, three 
Australian Accounting Standards have been issued to regulate the financial reporting of both 
superannuation plans2 and the (employing) entity sponsoring the plan.3  This standard-setting 
process has been controversial with both superannuation industry and employer groups 
opposed to the initial regulatory proposals.  This paper examines the incentives of public 
companies to lobby against4 the reporting requirements initially proposed for companies 
sponsoring superannuation plans.   
The relevant exposure draft ED 53 Accounting for Employee Entitlements was issued in 
August 1991 and contained proposals for both the measurement and recognition of 
superannuation obligations in the financial statements of sponsoring companies, representing 
a radical change to existing practice.  In response to lobbying on ED 53, the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB) took the unprecedented step of issuing an “interim” 
standard (AASB 1028 Accounting for Employee Entitlements) in June 1994, which excludes 
all the measurement and recognition requirements in relation to defined benefit 
superannuation obligations that were proposed in ED 53.  AASB 1028 requires only limited 
disclosure of superannuation information, as reported in the accounts of superannuation plans 
sponsored by employers. Thus, the business community successfully exercised its power and 
influence in the due process to avoid changes to existing practices (Henderson, 1996), 
ensuring that the resulting accounting standard contained significantly reduced requirements.   
Specifically, this paper examines the association between the decisions to lobby by public 
companies and potential adverse financial statement consequences of the regulatory 
proposals.  Studies in the U.S. have found that the decision to lobby on pension5 accounting 
                                                 
1 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Media Release “Superannuation Trends – December 1998”, 31 
March 1999.   
2  Superannuation entities are commonly referred to as ‘funds’ or ‘plans’; these terms are used interchangeably 
in this paper.   
3 AAS 25 Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans was issued in August 1990 and is effective from 30 
June 1992, and AASB 1028 and AAS 30 Accounting for Employee Entitlements were issued in March 1994 and 
are effective from 30 June 1995.   
4 A review of the submissions revealed that three of the 33 companies that lobbied were in agreement with (or 
made no comment on) the reporting proposals for companies sponsoring superannuation plans.  Two of these 
three companies only sponsored defined contribution plans.   
5 In the US and other overseas jurisdictions the term “pension” is commonly used to refer to employment-
related retirement benefits, whereas the term “superannuation” is used in Australia.   
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requirements is explained by expected (adverse) balance sheet and income statement effects 
of the proposed rules (Francis, 1987; Ndubizu, Choi and Jain, 1993).  Australian lobbyists 
used similar arguments to those that influenced the FASB to significantly change its position 
on pension accounting (Lambert and Gallery, 1996). This study investigates whether 
Australian public companies lobbying against ED 53 were also motivated by a desire to avoid 
undesirable financial statement effects, and if these were similar to those in the U.S.  A 
common criticism of previous lobbying studies is also addressed – the claim that lobbying 
behaviour may not truthfully reveal the preferences of lobbyists (Amershi, Demski and 
Wolfson, 1982; MacArthur, 1988; Walker and Robinson, 1993). The study is conducted in 
two stages.  First, the written submissions of public companies are examined in detail to 
identify the relative importance of superannuation-related issues as distinct from other types 
of employee benefits6, and to identify which of these were of greatest concern.  This process 
is intended both to inform the hypothesis development and to triangulate with the empirical 
evidence to see if companies truthfully reveal their concerns in the lobbying process.  
Second, economic characteristics of lobbying and non-lobbying companies are compared to 
identify whether (a) the types of arguments put by lobbyists are indicative of systematic 
differences between lobbyists and non-lobbyists, and (b) lobbyists and non-lobbyists differ 
on other dimensions identified as influential in U.S. studies on pension accounting. 
The analysis reveals that companies responding to ED 53 were predominantly concerned 
with issues relating to defined benefit superannuation plans, and with the adverse effects of 
the proposals on income volatility.  Consistent with this, companies sponsoring defined 
benefit plans are found to have been more likely to lobby against the proposals.  Companies 
that chose to lobby were also larger and had higher income volatility than non-lobbying 
companies.  Taken together, the results demonstrate links between the types of arguments 
used by lobbyists in their written submissions on ED 53 and potential adverse income 
statement effects of the proposals, thus providing richer explanations of lobbying behaviour. 
This paper differs from comparable U.S. studies (Francis, 1987 and Ndubizu et al., 1993) of 
lobbying behaviour on proposed pension accounting rules in three ways.  First, insights 
gained from a content analysis of companies’ submissions are exploited to inform the 
                                                 
6 The ED 53 proposals to account for various types of employee entitlements included wages, salaries, annual 
leave, sick leave, long service leave, superannuation and other post-employment benefits.  The section of ED 53 
that exclusively addressed superannuation issues extended over seven pages, whereas the sections devoted to all 
other types of employee entitlements total less than five pages. Superannuation is clearly the major and most 
complex single issue in ED 53.   
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hypothesis development.  Second, the foregoing analysis aids the assessment of whether 
lobbying companies truthfully reveal their preferences.  This innovation enriches both 
understanding of the lobbying process and the premise for the empirical analysis.  Third, the 
findings differ from those of relevant U.S. studies.  The U.S. studies report that potential 
adverse effects on both the income statement and balance sheet appeared to influence 
companies’ decisions to lobby.  In contrast, income statement effects appear to dominate the 
decisions of Australian companies to lobby on ED 53.  It is suggested that institutional 
differences explain this outcome.  These findings underscore the importance of giving due 
consideration to institutional factors when conducting similar studies across jurisdictions, or 
indeed when generalising results from one jurisdiction to another. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of 
superannuation accounting issues.  Official responses (submissions) of public companies to 
ED 53 are analysed in Section 3.  A discussion of the incentives for public companies to 
lobby on proposed superannuation accounting standards is presented in Section 4, together 
with hypothesis development, description of data and research method.  The results are 
presented in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6. 
2. Superannuation Accounting Issues and Related Rule Development 
Two types of superannuation plans are commonly used by employers to provide retirement 
income benefits to their employees: defined benefit plans (DBPs) and defined contribution 
plans (DCPs).  The principal features that distinguish the two types of plans are how 
members’ benefits are measured and relative risks borne by members and sponsoring 
employers.  In DBPs the amount of benefits paid to a superannuation fund member is 
typically pre-specified as a function of final salary and period of employment.  Given that 
sponsoring employers promise to provide a certain level of benefits when employees retire 
(or otherwise cease employment), employers bear the risk that benefits will cost more than 
expected (actuarial risk), and the risk that invested plan assets will generate insufficient 
returns (investment risk); employers effectively underwrite the plan (IASC, 1996).  In 
contrast, the obligation of employers sponsoring DCPs is limited to an agreed contribution 
rate, and thus an employer’s liability to provide promised benefits is discharged when 
periodic contributions are made to the plan.  Members’ benefits in DCPs comprise 
contributions and investment earnings thereon, which means that members bear the actuarial 
and investment risks.  Accounting for DBPs is more controversial (relative to DCPs) because 
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of the greater complexity and uncertainty associated with measuring accrued benefits, and the 
contentious issues of how superannuation expense should be measured and the extent to 
which superannuation plan assets and liabilities should be reflected in the accounts of 
sponsoring employer entities.   
Accrued benefits7 for DBPs are periodically measured by an actuary as the present value of 
expected future payments arising from membership of the superannuation fund up to the 
measurement date (AAS 25, para. 50).  The estimated amount of future payments is based on 
actuarial assumptions including such factors as mortality rates, future salary levels, 
membership turnover, and expected early withdrawal payments.  This gross amount is then 
discounted to present value using a market-determined, risk-adjusted discount rate approriate 
to the fund (AAS 25, para. 53).  Based on the actuary’s recommendations, employers (and in 
most cases employees) contribute to the plan at a certain rate of salaries.  This rate may be 
periodically reviewed and adjusted, depending on the present funding position of the plan, 
and changes in investment performance and underlying actuarial assumptions.   
Superannuation plan assets are measured at net market values8 (AAS 25, para. 37), and 
therefore the assets reported at each balance date will vary in accordance with changes in 
market values and investment returns, as well as the increases and decreases associated with 
contributions received from members and employers, and benefits paid to members during 
the reporting period.  Given the periodic variability of the amount of superannuation plan 
assets and accrued benefits, these two items are unlikely to be equal at any point in time.  
This means that at any balance date, if plan assets exceed accrued benefits, the plan is 
overfunded (in surplus), whereas if accrued benefits exceed plan assets, the plan is 
underfunded (in deficit).  Also, the variability in both the accrued benefits and assets 
measures means that the net plan funding position (surplus or deficit) can be highly volatile 
and unpredictable.  
The question of whether a superannuation plan surplus (deficit) represents an asset (liability) 
of the sponsoring company and how to account for such assets and liabilities are central to 
the controversy surrounding superannuation/pension accounting debates in Australia and 
overseas jurisdictions.  ED 53 proposed that employers sponsoring DBPs recognise the 
difference between the net market value of plan assets and the present value of members’ 
                                                 
7 Described in AAS 25 as the plan’s “liability for accrued benefits”.   
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accrued benefits as either an asset (where plan assets exceed accrued benefits) or a liability 
(where accrued benefits exceed plan assets).  ED 53 also proposed that accrued benefits and 
plan assets be measured  according to the specifications of AAS 25 Financial Reporting by 
Superannuation Plans, the accounting standard governing the financial reporting by the plans 
themselves.  However, ED 53 proposed the added requirements of measuring accrued 
benefits annually at each reporting date, whereas AAS 25 requires measurement of accrued 
benefits at least triennially and does not specify the measurement date.9   
The ED 53 proposals established a nexus between the superannuation plan’s funding position 
and the amount of superannuation expense recognised by the sponsoring company.10  
Immediate recognition of all changes in the plan’s surplus or deficit inevitably results in a 
volatile superannuation expense (ASB, 1995).  This volatility is due to the combined effects 
of measuring superannuation plan assets at net market value (which can vary significantly 
depending on the portfolio risk of plan investments), and variations in annual actuarial 
valuations of the accrued benefits liability (caused by changes in underlying assumptions 
e.g., interest rates). Small changes in assumptions can materially affect the magnitude of the 
plan’s net position (ASB, 1995), and consequently the superannuation expense recognised by 
the sponsoring company.  Depending on the direction of the period-to-period changes in the 
superannuation plan’s net position, the superannuation item included in the company’s 
reported profit or loss may swing between an expense and revenue.  Furthermore, the net 
position could move between a surplus and deficit from year to year, merely because of 
changes in the market performance of underlying superannuation fund assets (Archibald, 
1980). Given this potential for introducing additional volatility to companies’ reported 
income, caused by an item over which companies have little control in the short-term, it is 
not surprising that the dominant issues addressed by lobbyists on ED 53 related to the 
accounting for DBP proposals.11   
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Net market value is defined as “the amount which could be expected to be received from the disposal of an 
asset in an orderly market after deducting costs expected to be incurred in realising the proceeds of such a 
disposal” (AAS 25, para. 10).   
9 That is, the actuarial valuation date does not have to coincide with the superannuation plan’s reporting date.   
10 This proposal differs from existing practice.  Most companies with DBPs measure the superannuation 
expense as the amount of contributions made to the plan during the period and is usually based on the 
contribution rate (e.g. 9% of salaries) recommended by the fund’s actuary.  Any variations to this rate usually 
occur only every three years with triennial actuarial reviews and generally involve relatively small increases or 
decreases, based on the actuary’s revised estimates of the fund’s long-term funding position.  Thus, the 
superannuation expense presently recognised by companies each period is a relatively constant amount 
compared to what it would have been had the proposals in ED 53 been included in AASB 1028.   
11 Lambert and Gallery (1996) similarly find this in an analysis of written submissions of 83 private sector 
lobbyists (as opposed to this study’s focus on the subset of public company submissions) on ED 53.  Their 
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In a backdown from the proposals in ED 53 the subsequent accounting standard, AASB 
1028, was issued without any requirements for the measurement and recognition of 
employers’ superannuation obligations.  In reaching this decision the standard setting 
authorities (the AASB and the PSASB12) were clearly influenced by lobbying positions; they 
admitted that in light of the “many responses” addressing these issues, further consideration 
was warranted prior to finalising accounting standards for the recognition and measurement 
of employer’s superannuation obligations (Preface to AASB 1028).13  As an interim measure, 
AASB 1028 requires only limited note disclosure of information about sponsored DBP 
liabilities and assets, drawn from superannuation plan accounts prepared in accordance with 
AAS 25.  It is open to conjecture as to whether this information is of any value to users of 
company financial reports (Ang, Gallery and Sidhu, 1999).14   
Appendix A summarises the measurement, recognition and disclosures of defined benefit 
superannuation obligations that were proposed in ED 53, and the disclosure requirements 
under AASB 1028.  
3. Content Analysis of Lobbying Submissions on ED 53 by Public Companies 
Prior research has generally compared economic characteristics of lobbying versus non-
lobbying companies in order to analyse incentives to lobby. The choice of characteristics 
examined typically draws upon arguments based in contracting cost theory – that companies 
lobby to minimise adverse consequences of mandated accounting policies on debt and 
management compensation contracts, and/or to minimise political costs (e.g., Deakin, 1989; 
Dhaliwal, 1982; Francis, 1987; Mian and Smith, 1990; Sutton, 1984; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978).  Because lobbying is a costly activity, companies that lobby are also predicted to be 
larger because they are better able to capture the benefits of this activity (Sutton, 1984; Olson 
1965).15
                                                                                                                                                        
analysis focuses on the types of arguments that may have influenced Australian standard setters in their decision 
to exclude superannuation recognition and measurement requirements from AASB 1028.   
12 The Public Sector Accounting Standards Board.   
13  At the time AASB 1028 was issued (March 1994) the Boards stated their intention to amend the standard 
after due consideration had been given to these issues; however, no changes have been made to date.  Although 
the Boards had been hoping to develop standards based on the international standard IAS 19 Employee Benefits, 
they consider that the version of IAS 19 that was issued in March 1998 allows too many options that are 
unacceptable for adoption in an Australian accounting standard (AASB, 1998).   
14 It has been similarly suggested that concessions made by the profession with respect to AAS 25 concerning 
reporting for superannuation plans led to the reporting of information of little value.  See Klumpes (1994) for a 
discussion of the development of AAS 25.   
15 Firm size is also used as a proxy for political costs.  The two explanations are not empirically separable. 
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This literature has been criticised on several grounds.  Amershi et al. (1982) argue that given 
the interrelated and sequential nature of the lobbying process, lobbying behaviour on a 
particular issue cannot always be relied on to reveal true preferences.  It has also been 
suggested that lobbyists may omit or not directly address their concerns in submissions 
because their comments may be publicly unacceptable or may attract adverse economic or 
political repercussions (MacArthur, 1988).  While lobbying research has the advantage of 
pinpointing the preferences of particular entities for certain accounting methods at a 
particular point in time (Francis, 1987, p.37), it can be difficult to determine an overall 
lobbying position because lobbyists may support parts of a proposal whilst opposing others.  
Prior studies have often classified lobbyists as ‘for’ or ‘against’ proposals; however closer 
analysis of the contents of lobbyists’ submissions may reveal that the positions taken by the 
lobbyists are rarely so straight forward (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, p.104).  Thus, 
studies that interpret submissions merely as ‘votes’ and ignore the substance of submissions 
arguably provide limited insights into the nature of political activity in the standard-setting 
process (Walker and Robinson, 1993, p.9). 
This study adopts a more direct approach by analysing lobbying companies’ written 
submissions (stage one) to identify the factors of most concern to them.16  This analysis 
provides a basis for the subsequent hypothesis development (stage two) with respect to 
companies’ incentives to lobby on the proposals for employer reporting of superannuation 
commitments.  Specifically, the relative importance of superannuation in the submissions (as 
distinct from other types of employee benefits) is ascertained and the aspects of the 
superannuation proposals of greatest concern identified.  More generally, this approach can 
enable the researcher to determine the likely factors motivating lobbying behaviour and 
consequently, verify their relevance to accounting policy choices.17  Techniques such as the 
content analysis applied here are useful in assessing lobbyists’ level of concern about the 
potential implications of a standard in a direct fashion.  Reasons given for or against 
proposed accounting techniques can be identified, providing new insights into the potential 
effects of the standard.18
                                                 
16 Francis (1987) briefly considers the main issues raised in the submissions examined to classify firms as those 
with concerns about balance sheet or income statement effects.  In the present study a considerably more 
detailed examination of lobbying arguments is conducted to inform the hypothesis development.   
17 Few Australian lobbying studies have attempted to examine associations between firm-specific characteristics 
and their decision to lobby in the standard-setting process.  Two exceptions are studies by Morris (1986) and 
Pacecca (1995).   
18 This idea has been previously suggested but not implemented in the literature (e.g., King and O’Keefe, 1986; 
MacArthur, 1988; McKee, Williams and Frazier, 1991; Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994).   
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3.1 Method 
Content analysis has been described as a process of inquiry which “... relies not on casual 
reading but on rather explicit counting and coding of particular lines of prose, of word usage, 
and of disclosure” (Bowman, 1978, p.65).  In the context of examining the characteristics of 
lobbying companies’ submissions on ED 53, the aspects of concern are the issues and related 
arguments raised, the level of agreement with overall proposals, the length of submission, 
and the type of language used.  These aspects provide a direct and richer indication of 
lobbying positions than a simple ‘for’ or ‘against’ categorisation, as well as providing 
insights into the adequacy of the method of treating submissions as ‘votes’, where each 
submission is given equal weighting. 
All public company submissions to the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) 
in response to the proposals in ED 53 are reviewed in order to understand which aspects were 
perceived to be most important and why.  Whilst there were 108 submissions made to AARF 
on ED 53, only 33 were from public companies.19  Analysis is restricted to those 33 company 
submissions due to the difficulty of obtaining financial data and ascertaining the particular 
interests represented by non-corporate entities (e.g., accounting firms).20  A list of these 33 
companies appears in Appendix B; while the list is representative of a wide range of 
industries, note that a third of these companies belong to the mining industry. 
A review of the submissions reveals that a majority of the 33 companies opposed the 
superannuation measurement and recognition proposals in ED 53. Each of the submissions is 
analysed with regard to: (a) how important the superannuation proposals in ED 53 were 
relative to the proposals relating to other types of employee benefits, and (b) which 
arguments were used most frequently with respect to superannuation-related proposals; the 
findings follow. 
3.2 The relative importance of superannuation-related proposals in ED 53 
Approximate numbers of lines in submissions (both the number directly related to 
superannuation, and the total) are counted to gauge the degree of interest taken in the ED 53 
                                                 
19 A total of 38 corporate (including 5 private company) submissions on ED 53 were received by AARF, 
representing 36% of total submissions.  Weetman, Davie and Collins (1996) report that corporate lobbyists 
commonly comprise one-third to a half of all respondents.   
20 Other lobbyists included: public sector entities (25); various business and professional associations (11); 
superannuation service providers (11); accounting firms (10); individuals (10); private companies (5); 
superannuation funds (2); and a confidential submission (1).   
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proposals relating to accounting for DBPs in sponsoring company financial reports.  The 
results of this analysis are reported in Table 1.  Panel A shows the number of submissions by 
bands of relative submission length devoted to this issue.  Only three of the companies 
making submissions did not directly refer to superannuation-related proposals.  Two of these 
three companies sponsor only defined contribution (rather than defined benefit) plans; since 
the ED 53 proposals did not significantly change existing practice for DCPs, these companies 
had little reason to take issue with the exposure draft superannuation proposals.  Of the 
remaining companies (all of which sponsor DBPs), over 43 percent devoted more than half of 
their submission length directly to the issue of accounting for superannuation obligations.21
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
It is possible that this analysis understates the emphasis placed on accounting for DBPs, as 
ED 53 included a range of proposals for a range of employee entitlements, for example, the 
requirement that liabilities be measured at their present values.22 A conservative approach is 
adopted in this study in that only direct references to superannuation are reported (in Table 
1). That is, lobbying companies’ references to general measurement techniques (which affect 
all types of employee benefits) are not incorporated into the analysis.  This means that the 
analysis understates the extent of lobbying companies’ concern about the effects of these 
measurement proposals on accounting for superannuation in particular.   
Percentages of direct references to superannuation are not sufficient indicators in themselves.  
For example, while a submission may be fully directed at accounting for DBPs, it may only 
be ten lines long.  It is, therefore, difficult to compare it to a very lengthy submission that 
may have devoted only 30% to the issue of superannuation, but really argued for and against 
certain aspects of ED53 in greater detail.  Table 1, Panel B shows that not only did a majority 
of lobbying companies discuss superannuation in their submissions, but that the direct 
attention they gave the issue (as indicated by number of lines) was significant. 
3.3 Arguments most frequently used against DBP proposals 
                                                 
21 In the remainder of this paper the terms “accounting for superannuation” and “accounting for DBPs” are used 
interchangeably.    
22 A possible broader concern was with the “backdoor” introduction of present value measurement into financial 
statements; if left unchallenged it could leave the way open for standard setters to justify the use of present 
value accounting in other standards.   
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Lobbying companies’ concerns were principally about three aspects of accounting for DBPs: 
recognition of a superannuation net asset/liability (plan surplus/deficit) in the financial 
statements; the measurement requirements for plan assets and accrued members’ benefits; 
and, the treatment of changes in the net position of the plan.  Each aspect is discussed in turn. 
Recognition 
The most frequently expressed view with respect to recognition was that there is no legal 
entitlement to any surpluses, or legal obligation to fund any deficits of the plan.  Companies 
argued that the employer’s liability is usually limited to the amount of vested benefits.23  
Some also argued that recognition of a liability was inappropriate as they could terminate the 
plan at any stage, and had no obligation to fund a deficit, should it exist.  With respect to plan 
surpluses, a substantial proportion of lobbying companies asserted that recognition was 
unsuitable because the employer has no control over the way in which the surplus of the plan 
is to be utilised.  A few also argued that industrial relations issues would prevent them from 
successfully appropriating any surpluses of the plan.  Table 2, Panel A summarises the 
frequencies of these arguments.  It should be noted that some lobbying companies gave more 
than one reason for taking issue with the proposals and so are included in more than one 
category, thus frequencies reported in the table are not additive.  While lobbying companies 
provided a range of arguments against the ED 53 proposals for recognition of superannuation 
surpluses and deficits, all those that suggested an alternative were unanimous in their 
preference for note disclosure, rather than balance sheet recognition. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Measurement 
The proposed measurement rules attracted more attention.  Table 2, Panel B summarises the 
frequencies of the arguments against, and suggested alternatives to, the measurement 
proposals.  The requirement that plan assets be measured at net market values24 was met with 
opposition on the grounds that this form of measurement ignores the long-term nature of the 
plan, introducing unwarranted volatility into the employer’s financial statements.  There was 
also a strong negative reaction to the proposed measurement of plan liabilities at present 
                                                 
23 Vested benefits are benefits that are not conditional on continued plan membership or any other factor other 
than resignation from the plan (AAS 25, para. 10).   
24 “Net market value” is defined in AAS 25 (paragraph 10) as “the amount which could be expected to be 
received from the disposal of an asset in an orderly market after deducting costs expected to be incurred in 
realising the proceeds of such a disposal”.   
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values.  It was argued that implementation of present value accounting for liabilities would 
introduce subjectivity into the accounts, leading to decreased comparability between 
reporting entities and increased costs and complications.  It was also claimed that the 
accounts would be harder to understand.  Further, present value accounting was argued to be 
inconsistent with the historical cost measurement model.  This issue was seen as deserving 
debate on a wider scale before implementing it as the measurement method for employee 
entitlements.  The requirement that annual actuarial reviews of plan position be undertaken 
was considered too costly and impractical, particularly given the fact that actuarial reviews 
are only required on a triennial basis by legislation governing the operation of DBPs.25  Note 
that most arguments used against the ED 53 proposals for the measurement and recognition 
of plan assets and liabilities were presented on a conceptual basis; few companies based their 
arguments on economic consequences issues. 
Treatment of changes in plans’ net position 
ED 53 proposed that any changes in the DBP’s net position between the beginning and end of 
the reporting period be reflected in the profit and loss statement of the sponsoring employer 
company.26  This proposal drew a larger response than any other proposal relevant to DBPs, 
as indicated by the frequencies of respondents’ arguments and suggestions presented in Table 
2, Panel C.  Eighty two per cent of public company respondents asserted that such a 
requirement ignored the long-term nature of superannuation plans and would introduce 
increased volatility into the accounts.  Conformity with practice in the U.K. and the U.S., 
where pension expenses are ‘smoothed’ by allowing for systematic amortisation of changes 
in plan position over an extended period, was urged.27  There was concern that even small 
movements in plan position under the proposed measurement scheme could obscure the 
results of operations of employer companies.  With only one exception, all respondents who 
used the increased volatility argument suggested that some form of smoothing of the 
superannuation expense item should be allowed. 
                                                 
25 The Occupational Superannuation Standards Act 1987 was in effect at that time but has since been 
superceded by the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993; both require an actuarial review of DBPs at 
least every three years.   
26 For example, if a firm sponsored a DBP with $1.4 million surplus at the beginning of the year and a $1.1 
million surplus at the end of the year, then the firm would be required to recognise the surplus as an asset in the 
balance sheet, and the $300,000 change in the surplus during the year would be part of the superannuation 
expense included in the reported profit/loss for the year.   
27 Lobbyists who used the ‘inconsistent with overseas practice’ argument seemed to do so selectively in that 
none advocated that actuarial valuations be performed annually (as required in the U.S.) rather than triennially.   
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Summary 
The arguments against superannuation asset/liability measurement and recognition issues 
were generally made on a conceptual basis, while those in opposition to the expense 
measurement proposals focussed on the potentially adverse income statement effects of the 
proposed standard.28  Overall, the above analysis indicates that while lobbyists expressed 
concerns about the conceptually undesirable aspects of balance sheet recognition of a 
superannuation asset/liability, they were predominantly concerned with the potential for 
increased volatility in reported income.  This is seen in both the direct references to the latter 
in response to the proposed treatment of superannuation expense, as well as in the arguments 
put against the treatment of superannuation assets and liabilities.  The potential for increased 
volatility in underlying plan assets and liabilities (and by implication, in reported income) 
featured prominently in the submissions.  Thus, it appears that lobbying companies were 
more concerned with potential income statement effects of the ED 53 proposals than balance 
sheet effects. 
4. Incentives to Lobby on Proposed Superannuation Accounting Standards 
The preceding analysis of corporate submissions on ED 53 provides insights into the possible 
incentives that may have influenced companies in their decision to lobby (as opposed to 
companies that did not lobby).  To assess whether ED 53 lobbyists raised genuine concerns 
about the proposals (as opposed to “smokescreen” arguments), hypotheses are developed 
about income volatility (the major concern expressed in the submissions), as well as other 
company-specific factors which might indicate incentives to lobby.  These factors are 
company size, leverage and net position of the sponsored DBP, and are derived from the 
typical contracting cost arguments utilised in related U.S. studies on proposed changes to 
pension accounting rules in that country.  The results of those studies are briefly described 
next. 
Two studies have examined lobbying in the pension accounting standard setting process in 
the U.S.  Francis (1987) considers the comment letters of companies who responded to 
Preliminary Views (FASB 1982), a document which presented the FASB’s position on 
                                                 
28 Arguments that the proposals are inconsistent with overseas practice do not necessarily infer that lobbyists 
consider the proposals are conceptually unsound.   
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employer accounting for DBPs.29  He tests for associations between lobbying behaviour and 
company-specific factors: size, net pension liability (or asset), and pension expense.  Both 
company size and the potential for adverse effects on the balance sheet and the income 
statement are found to explain the decision to lobby.  Ndubizu et al. (1993) examine lobbying 
behaviour pursuant to the Exposure Draft which followed Preliminary Views.  In addition to 
the hypotheses examined by Francis (1987), they analyse the importance of earnings 
volatility on corporate lobbying behaviour.  Their results are consistent with those of Francis, 
finding that lobbying companies are larger, more highly levered and have a proportionately 
higher pension expense than non-lobbyists.  Additionally, they find that lobbying companies 
have higher earnings volatility. 
While there are many parallels between the U.S. and Australian experiences in the respective 
standard setters’ attempts to regulate pension/superannuation accounting,30 the similarities do 
not necessarily translate into common incentives for companies in each jurisdiction to lobby. 
Institutional differences between the Australian and U.S. superannuation/pension systems 
could bring about differences in incentives to lobby.  A major institutional difference is the 
more mature, complex and stringent pension legislation operating in the U.S., with statutory 
insurance guaranteeing pension benefits in the event of termination of underfunded plans.  In 
contrast, Australian superannuation legislation is relatively new with limited provisions 
relating specifically to DBPs, providing no insurance protection of benefits.  Furthermore, the 
U.S. legislation imposes a statutory obligation on employers to fund plans and establishes a 
lien over the sponsoring company’s assets. Australian legislation does not require employer-
sponsors to fund promised defined benefits, nor does it create any claims on the employer-
sponsor’s assets in the event of termination of an underfunded plan.  Other significant 
institutional differences include the timing and frequency of actuarial valuations, funding 
                                                 
29 Saemann (1995) notes that the FASB issuing ‘Preliminary Views’ was unusual in that such a document has 
not been used in the due process prior to, or indeed, since SFAS 87; this added step in the due process suggests 
that the FASB anticipated that the pension accounting proposals would be controversial.   
30 The intense lobbying on U.S. pension accounting proposals in the early 1980s resulted in a FASB Standard 
with significant compromises on key issues.  SFAS 87 was described as the most complex accounting standard 
issued in the U.S. with complicated calculations to determine both the pension expense and the pension 
obligation to be recognised and/or disclosed.  The standard allows smoothing of both pension assets and 
liabilities (accrued benefits), and requires only minimal amounts to be actually recognised in the financial 
statements; the major change was merely the requirement for more disclosure of standardised measures of 
pension obligations (Miller, 1987).  This experience was largely mirrored in Australia where lobbyists also used 
arguments similar to those that had influenced the FASB to significantly modify their proposals (Lambert and 
Gallery, 1996).  The Australian standard setters also backed down on their initial proposals by deciding to issue 
AASB 1028 absent any superannuation measurement or recognition requirements, and deferring the issue for 
consideration and decision at a later unspecified date.  As noted previously, AASB 1028 has not yet been 
amended and no other pronouncement on employers’ superannuation accounting has been issued.   
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arrangements and fund governance structures.  Appendix C provides further details of these 
differences.  Different regulatory and operating environments probably explain why very few 
Australian DBPs are underfunded (in deficit), whereas the incidence of underfunding in U.S. 
plans is relatively common.31,32   
4.1 Types of Superannuation Plans Sponsored by Lobbyists 
The analysis in Section 3 revealed that corporate lobbyists were most concerned about the 
proposed accounting treatment of superannuation entitlements (as opposed to other types of 
employee entitlements).  Furthermore, they were principally concerned with the proposed 
accounting requirements for defined benefit plans (DBPs).  Thus, 
H1:  Lobbying companies are more likely than non-lobbying companies to sponsor defined 
benefit plans rather than defined contribution plans only. 
Since the ED 53 proposals would have financial statement consequences only for companies 
with exposure to DBPs, all subsequent hypotheses are confined to the lobbying incentives of 
these companies. 
4.2 Income Volatility 
The proposals in ED 53 would have affected reported income of companies sponsoring DBPs 
in two ways.  First, the proposed rules would have reduced the flexibility available to 
management with respect to the measurement of superannuation expense33, which would 
include the change in the net position of the sponsored superannuation fund (i.e. 
superannuation fund assets less the fund’s liability for accrued benefits).34  Second, this 
                                                 
31 Schroeder (1993) reports that 15% of U.S. plans were underfunded in 1993.  In contrast, Ang et al. (1999) 
find that in 1995, only one of the defined benefit plans sponsored by the top 200 Australian companies was 
underfunded.  
32  Differences in actuarial practices between Australia and the U.S. may also explain differences in the relative 
funding positions of DBPs in the two countries.   
33 Loss of flexibility with respect to the reported pension expense was also a concern of companies lobbying 
against the U.S. pension proposals that led up to SFAS 87 (Miller, 1987; Wolk, Francis and Tearney, 1992).   
34 At present the amount of superannuation expense recognised is simply the amount of cash contributions 
actually made (or committed) each year, usually based on the actuaries’ recommended rate of contributions.   If 
ED 53 proposals had been adopted, however, the superannuation expense reported by companies would have 
been the amount of contributions plus or minus the change in the sponsored fund’s net position.  Thus 
management’s flexibility in determining the amount of superannuation expense recognised each reporting 
period would have been reduced.   
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measure would have increased volatility in the superannuation expense item and hence, net 
income.35
As noted in Section 3, over 80 per cent of lobbying companies argued that the ED 53 
proposals would increase volatility in companies’ reported income, suggesting these 
companies prefer a smooth income stream.  This is consistent with the income smoothing 
literature which suggests that managers view earnings variability as undesirable, and will 
attempt to dampen earnings fluctuations around some level of earnings which is considered to 
be normal for the company (Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Scott, 1991).  Managers’ motivation to 
smooth income is influenced by both perceptions of external users of companies’ financial 
reports, as well as compensation bonus schemes that tie managers’ rewards to reported 
earnings (Ronen and Sadan, 1981).   
Earnings volatility/uncertainty affects the market’s assessment of company risk and has 
implications for the valuation of the company.  Thus, managers have incentives to smooth 
income to reduce the actual or perceived riskiness of the company (Barth, Elliot and Finn, 
1997; Bitner and Dolan, 1996; Michelson, Jordan-Wagner and Wootton, 1995; Moses, 1987).  
Trueman and Titman (1988) suggest that, independent of risk aversion, managers have 
incentives to smooth income so as to influence various claimants of the company in their 
estimates of the variability in the company’s underlying earnings process.  This will lead to a 
lower assessment of the probability of bankruptcy, thus decreasing the company’s cost of 
borrowing.  Furthermore, in situations where managers’ remuneration is tied to accounting 
outcomes, there are incentives to manipulate the accounting numbers to report smooth 
performance results (Francis, 1987; Gaver, Gaver and Austin, 1995; Healy, 1985; Lambert, 
1984; MacArthur, 1993).  The superannuation accounting requirements as proposed by ED 
53 would have resulted in managers losing flexibility in choosing how to measure 
superannuation expense, and consequently reduced opportunities for managers to smooth 
reported income to achieve bonus plan targets. 
In the presence of these market-induced and remuneration-linked motivations to report 
smoothed earnings, managers of companies that already have relatively large fluctuations in 
                                                 
35 Note that the submissions on ED 53 consistently argued this.  In order for this not to be true (that is, for the 
change in recognition of superannuation expense to smooth rather than increase the volatility of income), the 
change in superannuation net position would have to be negatively correlated with changes in net income.  We 
have no reason to believe that this would systematically be the case.  In support of this view note that the U.K. 
Accounting Standards Board  (ASB, 1995, para. 44) states that “where all changes in surplus and deficiency are 
recognised immediately there will inevitably be a volatile pension cost”.   
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their income stream have incentives to lobby against proposed accounting changes that will 
potentially cause further increases in income variability.  Thus,  
H2: Among companies that sponsor defined benefit plans, lobbying companies have 
higher income volatility than non-lobbying companies. 
4.3 Balance Sheet Recognition of Superannuation Asset/Liability 
ED 53 proposed that the net funding position – the difference between the assets of defined 
benefit plans (net of disposal costs) and the liability for accrued members’ benefits –be 
recognised in the sponsoring company’s balance sheet as an asset (surplus) or a liability 
(deficit).  Depending on the relative magnitude of the net superannuation asset/liability, the 
potential effect of recognition is to significantly change balance sheet ratios.  Both Francis 
(1987) and Ndubizu et al., (1993) report that a substantial number of (lobbying) companies in 
the U.S. expressed concerns about the negative effect of pension liability recognition on 
leverage.  Francis (1987) finds a statistically significant association between lobbying and 
pension funding position in that the net pension liability of lobbying companies was larger 
than that of non-lobbying companies.36
While pension plan underfunding is common among U.S. companies, evidence indicates that 
the vast majority of Australian defined benefit plans are overfunded (SSCS, 1992; Ang et al., 
1999). This probably explains why fewer ED 53 respondents commented on adverse balance 
sheet effects.  Given that Australian companies would have recognised an asset under the ED 
53 proposals, it is not clear whether the funding positions of their superannuation plans 
would have influenced their decision to lobby.  To the extent that plan funding positions did 
influence lobbying behaviour, it is predicted that lobbying companies have a relatively 
smaller superannuation asset.  This is predicated on the observation that the closer the ratio of 
accrued benefits to plan assets is to one (i.e., the smaller the net asset position), the more 
likely it is that accrued benefits will exceed plan assets (surplus flips to deficit) in the future.  
Thus, 
H3: Among companies that sponsor defined benefit plans, the net superannuation asset of 
lobbying companies is smaller than that of non-lobbying companies. 
                                                 
36 Francis (1987) reports that the proportion of firms in his sample with pension liabilities was 14%, with the 
same proportion for lobbyists and non-lobbyists.   
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Furthermore, in the presence of material superannuation liabilities, companies with debt 
covenants in place risk default if their leverage levels are already high.37  Companies that are 
not close to breaching any covenants but nevertheless have fairly high levels of debt may also 
oppose the proposed standard because it has the potential to raise contracting costs in the 
future. Thus, 
H4: Among companies that sponsor defined benefit plans, lobbying companies have 
higher leverage ratios than non-lobbying companies. 
4.4       Company Size 
Following Olson (1965), Sutton (1984) argues that larger companies have economic 
incentives to lobby because they are wealthier than smaller companies, and therefore their 
expected total benefits from lobbying are generally large enough to outweigh the costs.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that because large companies are more politically 
visible, company size proxies for political costs.  While Ball and Foster (1982) caution 
against the use of size as a proxy for political costs, increased income volatility may present 
special problems for large companies in that they are likely to incur additional political costs 
(e.g., through union demands, limitations imposed through price controls) during periods of 
high profits (Kelly, 1982; MacArthur, 1993).  Francis (1987) suggests that subject to the 
existence of the company size-political costs relationship, tests of company size in a lobbying 
context are joint tests of companies’ economic incentives to lobby and the political costs of 
lobbying.  Thus, it is predicted that 
H5: Among companies that sponsor defined benefit plans, lobbying companies are larger 
than non-lobbying companies. 
4.5 Data and Research Method 
The task in the second stage of this study is to compare the predicted characteristics between 
lobbying and non-lobbying companies, requiring a sample of non-lobbying companies.  
Recall that hypothesis one requires a comparison of lobbying behaviour of companies 
sponsoring at least one defined benefit plan with those sponsoring defined contribution plans 
only.  All subsequent hypotheses require comparisons of economic characteristics between 
lobbying and non-lobbying companies within a sample of companies with at least one defined 
                                                 
37 High leverage has previously been shown to proxy for closeness to debt constraints and other factors such as 
investment opportunities (Press and Weintrop, 1990; Scott, 1991).   
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benefit plan.  Thus, two samples of lobbying and non-lobbying companies are required.  The 
process of sample selection for the testing of hypotheses is described below.  
Sample for Hypothesis 1 
The initial sample was drawn from the top 150 public companies (ranked by market 
capitalisation) on 30 June 1995, the effective application date of AASB 1028.   Annual 
reports were available for 137 of the Top 150.  Of these 137 companies, 14 were not listed 
public companies in 1991,38 one is not an Australian company and 20 made no mention of 
their accounting policies with respect to superannuation.  This left a sample of 102 
companies, 68 sponsoring at least one defined benefit plan and 34 sponsoring only defined 
contribution plans.  These 102 companies were cross-checked against those that made 
submissions in response to ED 53, to identify 22 companies in this sample which had lobbied 
(21 with at least one DBP, and 1 with DCPs only).  The remaining 80 are classified as non-
lobbying companies (47 with at least one DBP and 33 with DCPs only). 
Sample for Hypotheses 2 to 5 
Hypotheses 2 to 5 require a sample made up of companies that (a) were in the Top 150 at 
June 1995; (b) are domiciled in Australia (and, therefore, have to comply with Australian 
reporting requirements); (c) sponsor DBPs and (d) disclose sufficient information for our data 
requirements.39  Fifty-eight companies (21 lobbying,40 37 non-lobbying) meet these 
requirements and constitute the final sample used to test H2 through to H5.  The 21 lobbying 
companies are a subset of the population of public companies that lobbied on ED 53 and are 
marked with an asterisk in Appendix C.   
                                                 
38 To be included in the sample firms had to have been listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1991, the 
year that ED 53 was issued.   
39 Examples of insufficient disclosure include total omission of any financial data (some companies revealed 
only that they had plans, others simply that the assets of the plan were sufficient to meet any liabilities), 
disclosure of some data (eg. net market values of plan assets, and vested benefits, but no figure for accrued 
benefits), or disclosure of complete data for only some of the plans in place.   
40 Twelve of the 33 lobbying companies had to be removed from the sample because they did not meet the 
requirements: 1 was not in the Top 150 at June 1995; 6 are not domiciled in Australia; 2 do not sponsor DBPs 
(one of which also was not in the Top 150 at June 1995); 2 companies were delisted prior to June 1995; and 1 
disclosed insufficient data.   
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Research Method 
A chi-square test is used to explore H1.  With respect to H2 through to H5, univariate tests 
are performed for between group (lobbying vs. non-lobbying) differences in the explanatory 
variables. 
In accordance with the expectation that the predominant factor that influenced the decision to 
lobby on ED 53 was the potential effect on income volatility (H2), and that larger companies 
prefer a smooth income stream (H5), a logistic regression model is estimated to test for 
differences in earnings volatility between lobbying and non-lobbying companies, while 
controlling for company size.  Also, given the findings of U.S. pension accounting studies, 
and suggestions in the lobbying literature that lobbyists possibly do not disclose their ‘true’ 
concerns, balance sheet incentives to lobby (H3 and H4) are also incorporated into the model:  
  L  =  β0  + β1 INCVOL + β2 SIZE  + β3 NETSUP + β4 LEV    
where, 
L   =  Lobbying (1) or non-lobbying (0)   
INCVOL = Standard deviation of earnings per share for 5 years from 1989 to 1993    
SIZE   =  Total sales (millions)    
NETSUP =  Net superannuation asset (liability) / Total assets   
LEV  =  Total Liabilities / Total Assets   
Variable Measurement 
While ED 53 was issued in 1991, the subsequent standard AASB 1028 did not take effect 
until 30 June 1995.  Due to the negligible disclosure on superannuation plans sponsored by 
companies prior to this date, superannuation plan (NETSUP) data are only available for 1995 
and subsequent years.  To be consistent with the measurement date for this item, other 
financial statement data  (SIZE and LEV) are also collected from annual reports from the first 
reporting period ending on or after 30 June 1995.  The sensitivity of the reported results to 
this choice of measurement date for SIZE and LEV is also examined. 
INCVOL is measured over the five years that include the three years prior to the ED 53 lobby 
period, the year of lobbying and the year following the lobby period.  The sensitivity of the 
reported results to this choice of time period is also investigated. 
 
5. Analysis of Results 
H1 is tested using a Chi-square test of association between lobbying and non-lobbying 
companies and whether they sponsor DBPs or DCPs.  A cross-tabulation of the frequencies 
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and Chi-square results are shown in Table 3.  Consistent with H1, there is a higher incidence 
of lobbying companies sponsoring defined benefit rather than defined contribution plans (χ2 
= 10.46, p = 0.001).  Among the non-lobbying companies there is a more even distribution of 
type of plan sponsored.  This evidence is consistent with the expectation that companies with 
DBPs had a greater incentive to lobby to forestall potentially adverse financial statement 
effects of the relevant ED 53 proposals. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the variables relevant for H2 through to H5 are 
reported in Table 4.  As predicted, INCVOL, SIZE and LEV are significantly different 
between lobbying and non-lobbying companies.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, earnings 
volatility (INCVOL) of lobbying companies is almost twice that of non-lobbying companies 
(Z = 2.484, p = 0.007).  The results also support Hypothesis 4 in that lobbying companies 
have an average leverage ratio (LEV) of 0.583 which is 20 per cent higher than that of the 
non-lobbying companies at 0.487 (Z = 2.027, p = 0.020).  Volume of sales (SIZE) of lobbying 
companies is more than three times greater than non-lobbying companies (Z = 3.115, p = 
0.001), providing support for Hypothesis 5 which predicts that lobbying companies are 
larger.  However, the univariate results do not support Hypothesis 3 – the between-group 
difference for the net superannuation asset/liability (NETSUP) is not statistically significant.  
Thus, the relative funding position of the DBPs sponsored by lobbying companies does not 
appear to have influenced companies’ decision to lobby.  This result is not surprising given 
that in all cases except one,41 superannuation plan assets exceed the liability for accrued 
benefits (net surplus) and, therefore, companies would have recognised a superannuation 
asset.  Also, NETSUP (size of the superannuation asset/liability as a ratio of companies’ total 
assets) does not appear to be material, with a mean value of 1 per cent for lobbying and 1.5 
per cent for non-lobbying companies. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regression model while Spearman tests for 
correlations between the independent variables are presented in Table 6.   
                                                 
41 Note from Table 4 that the one exception is a non-lobbying firm and its NETSUP is a very small negative 
number.   
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The results in Table 5 show that the model is statistically significant (χ2 = 19.81, p = 0.001).   
A rough approximation of the predictive efficacy of the model is indicated by the logistic 
regression R2 statistic (Demaris, 1992) shown as 0.26.  The coefficients on INCVOL and SIZE 
are statistically significant and in the predicted direction.  Although LEV is significant in the 
univariate analysis, it is not statistically significant in the multivariate analysis.  NETSUP is 
not statistically significant in either the univariate or the multivariate analyses.  These results 
suggest that company size (political costs) and income variability, rather than balance sheet 
factors, dominated the decision to lobby.42
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE] 
With the exception of LEV, the logistic regression results are consistent with the univariate 
test results.  Possible reasons for the differing results for LEV are explored by investigating  
whether there are interactive effects between leverage and INCVOL and / or SIZE.  The 
model is re-estimated by first including the three variables other than INCVOL, and then 
conducting another test including the three variables other than SIZE.  In both tests LEV is 
not significant, while both INCVOL and SIZE remain significant.  This suggests that while 
lobbying companies tend to have high leverage, it is not a significant factor in companies’ 
decision to lobby, when controlling for size or earnings volatility.   
The overall conclusion that is drawn from the preceding logistic regression analysis is that 
the factors that dominated companies’ decision to lobby on ED 53 are their size and a desire 
to avoid even higher (and largely uncontrollable) income variability.  While some firms 
comment on the potential adverse balance sheet effects, these effects do not appear to be 
influential in the decision to lobby.  That is, balance sheet effects do not statistically 
differentiate lobbying from non-lobbying firms..  These results are consistent with a greater 
number of lobbying companies expressing concerns about income statement effects, rather 
than balance sheet effects, in their ED 53 submissions. 
These findings are not consistent with previous U.S. studies that examined lobbying 
behaviour on proposed pension accounting standards.  Francis (1987) finds that both 
company size and the pension assets/liability were significant explanators while Ndubizu et 
al. (1993) find that company size, leverage and earnings volatility were all significant in 
                                                 
42 In a similar model based only on income volatility and size as independent variables, both are statistically 
significant at similar levels with a model R2 of 0.26.  Thus, the addition of balance sheet variables in the 
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relation to the lobbying decision.  Thus, while U.S. evidence shows that lobbyists were 
influenced by both income statement and balance sheet effects, the results of this study 
indicate that only the income statement effects were important in the Australian context. 
Differences in findings between this study and similar U.S. studies are probably explained by 
institutional differences.  As highlighted in Appendix C, Australian superannuation plans and 
U.S. pension plans significantly differ in both their nature and regulatory environments in 
which they operate. One significant difference is that it is relatively more common for U.S. 
companies’ defined benefit plans to be underfunded compared to their Australian 
counterparts.  Furthermore, the net superannuation asset/liability that would have had to be 
recognised on the balance sheet by Australian companies is not material, with lobbying 
companies averaging a superannuation surplus of 1% of total company assets, and non-
lobbying companies averaging a 1.5% surplus.  In comparison, Francis’ (1987) sample of 
U.S. companies shows that the amounts are material, with lobbying and non-lobbying 
companies respectively averaging a deficit of 8.9% and 5.4% of company assets.  Given such 
disparity in relative funding of sponsored plans, it is not surprising that balance sheet effects 
were influential in the lobbying decision of U.S. companies, but not so for Australian 
companies.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity of the reported results to the measurement of SIZE and LEV as at 30 June 
1995, rather than at the time of lobbying in 1992, is tested.  Recall that this choice was made 
to maintain consistency with the measurement date for NETSUP, data for which is 
unavailable before 1995.  Recognising that the lobbying companies’ financial characteristics 
may have been different at the time of lobbying (late 1991 to early 1992), all tests are 
replicated based on 1992 data for SIZE and LEV.  The results of these replications are 
consistent with those reported using 1995 data, suggesting that the relative size and leverage 
of the companies in the sample are stable over time.  
To test whether the reported results are sensitive to the period over which INCVOL is 
estimated, INCVOL is recalculated using company earnings reported for the five years from 
1988 to 1992 (the lobbying year and the four prior years).  Alternative measures of SIZE 
(natural log of assets and natural log of market capitalisation) are also used in the sensitivity 
                                                                                                                                                        
reported model does not increase its explanatory power. 
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analysis.  The alternative measures of INCVOL and SIZE do not change the inferences drawn 
from the logistic regressions. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Superannuation accounting is a highly controversial issue, which is reflected in the 
Australian standard setters’ decision to drop the ED 53 recognition and measurement 
proposals for superannuation assets, liabilities and expense from AASB 1028 in response to 
lobbying pressure.   Instead, the standard requires only limited disclosure of superannuation 
information in notes to sponsoring companies’ accounts. This is a unique achievement for 
lobbyists, as never before have Australian standard setters released a standard expressing an 
intention to make specific changes to it in the future (Lambert and Gallery, 1996, p.2).  The 
fact that lobbyists’ efforts were so successful makes an investigation of the factors that 
impelled them to lobby particularly interesting. 
This study has used a two-stage process to examine the incentives for public companies to 
lobby against the ED 53 proposals on superannuation accounting.  First, an analysis of 
written submissions made by public companies reveals that lobbyists were predominantly 
concerned with the issues relating to defined benefit superannuation plans and the adverse 
effects of the proposals on income volatility.  A comparison of the types of superannuation 
plans sponsored by lobbying companies with a sample of non-lobbying companies found that 
significantly more lobbyists sponsored defined benefit plans than non-lobbyists did.  Second, 
a comparison of the economic characteristics of lobbying versus non-lobbying companies 
reveals systematic differences in income volatility and size, but not leverage and net funding 
position of the sponsored superannuation plan.  Lobbying companies were found to be larger 
and have higher income volatility than non-lobbying companies. 
These findings have important implications for both lobbying research and the standard 
setting process.  This is the first (known) Australian lobbying study that attempts to link the 
content of exposure draft submissions with potential effects of the accounting proposals on 
lobbyists’ financial statements.  The findings demonstrate that examination of associations 
between the content of lobbying companies’ written comments and company-specific 
characteristics provides more meaningful explanations of incentives to lobby.  Differences 
between the findings reported here and similar U.S. pension accounting lobby studies are 
explained by institutional differences.  Such differences provide fair warning to researchers 
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about the importance of giving due consideration to institutional factors when conducting 
similar studies across jurisdictions, or in generalising results from one jurisdiction to others.   
Another implication of the findings relates to whether lobbying companies ‘truthfully’ reveal 
their concerns about particular accounting issues.  Amershi et al. (1982) state that given that 
lobbying on any particular issue is part of an ongoing process (of lobbying) on a whole 
sequence of issues, the relationship between lobbyists’ preferences on a particular issue and 
their behaviour on that issue may not be clear; accordingly, they claim that lobbying 
behaviour cannot always be relied on to reveal preferences.  MacArthur (1988) suggests that 
lobbyists may omit or not directly address their concerns in submissions because their 
comments may be publicly unacceptable or may attract adverse economic or political 
repercussions.  Walker and Robinson (1993) suggest that such issues present difficulties in 
the interpretation of written submissions.  However, at least in the case of the superannuation 
accounting proposals, the findings of this study demonstrate that there are links between the 
stated concerns of lobbying companies and their actual economic circumstances – the types 
of arguments put forward by lobbying companies reflected their real concerns.  They had 
strong views on the potential for increased income volatility in the ED 53 proposals and were 
not reticent in putting their objections forward. 
The findings of this study have implications for the due process in that standard-setters 
should not assume that lobbying companies are representative of all companies affected by 
proposed accounting standards (Francis, 1987). The evidence presented here indicates that 
lobbying and non-lobbying companies are different in terms of both size and income 
variability.  Although it is not known to what degree the AASB’s deliberations were 
influenced by public company submissions, nor which of the arguments put by lobbying 
companies were deemed compelling, there can be little doubt that the lobbying process was 
influential.  
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Table 1 
References to Superannuation Issues in the Submissions Made by 33 Public Listed 
Companies Lobbying in Response to ED 53 
 
 
PANEL A:   Percentage of Submission Lines Directly Referring to Superannuation 
 
Direct References to DBPs 
as a Percentage of Total 
Length 
Number of Submissions Percentage of Submissions 
0% 3 9% 
1-19% 2 6% 
20-29% 3 9% 
30-39% 7 21% 
40-49% 4 12% 
50-59% 3 9% 
60-69% 2 6% 
70-79% 1 3% 
80-89% 1 3% 
90-99% 1 3% 
100% 6 19% 
Total 33 100% 
   
 
 
 
PANEL B:   Number of Submission Lines Directly Referring to Superannuation 
 
Number of Lines Submissions Percentage of submissions 
0 3 9% 
1-24 3 9% 
25-49 14 42% 
50-74 6 18% 
75-99 2 6% 
100-124 4 12% 
>125 1 3% 
Total 33 100% 
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Table 2 
Frequencies of Arguments and Suggestions Presented by Public Companies Lobbying 
in Response to ED 53 (n=33). 
 
 
PANEL A:  Recognition of Superannuation Net Asset (Surplus) or Liability (Deficit) 
 
Arguments 
 
n 
Percentage of 
Submissions 
Employer has no legal obligation to fund the deficit, or entitlement to 
appropriate the surplus 
 
14 
 
42% 
Employer has no control over the fund surplus 6 18% 
Proposals are inconsistent with overseas practice 2 6% 
Obligation cannot be reliably measured, nor is there probable settlement 1 3% 
   
Suggestion   
Any surplus/deficit should be disclosed in the notes to the balance sheet 9 27% 
 
PANEL B:  Measurement of  Superannuation Plan Assets and Liabilities 
 
Plan Assets:  Arguments 
 
n 
Percentage of 
Submissions 
Requirements disregard the long-term nature of the plan, and introduce 
unwarranted volatility to the accounts 
 
9 
 
27% 
Requirements will adversely affect investment strategies 1 3% 
Requirement is inconsistent with historical cost accounting  1 3% 
   
Plan Assets:  Suggestions   
Use an actuarially determined asset value 2 6% 
Use a smoothed market value figure 1 3% 
 
Plan Liabilities:  Arguments 
  
Discount rates are too subjective and complicated 9 27% 
Inconsistent with overseas practice 5 15% 
Annual revaluation is too costly and impractical 10 30% 
   
Plan Liabilities:  Suggestions   
Conduct open debate to resolve the issue of whether to use historical cost or 
present value accounting 
 
7 
 
21% 
Improve guidance on how companies should arrive at an appropriate risk-
adjusted discount rate 
 
5 
 
15% 
 
PANEL C:  Measurement of Superannuation Expense 
 
Arguments 
 
n 
Percentage of 
Submissions 
The treatment will introduce too much volatility into the financial statements, 
resulting in an inadequate reflection of companies’ performance. 
 
27 
 
82% 
The proposed treatment is at odds with overseas practice 18 55% 
The proposed treatment will impact unfairly on the sponsoring company’s 
performance* 
 
5 
 
15% 
   
Suggestion   
Amortise any changes in plan position 26 79% 
* While this argument may appear the same as the first one listed, it is slightly different in that the companies are lobbying 
against the proposed treatment on the basis that the sponsoring company has no control over the plan’s actions. In 
contrast, the first argument emphasises more the fact that the treatment is one which has the potential to introduce a great 
deal of volatility. 
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Table 3 
Frequencies of Lobbying/Non-lobbying Companies Cross-tabulated with  
Type of Superannuation Plan Sponsored 
 
 Lobbying 
Companies 
Non-lobbying 
Companies 
Total 
Type of Superannuation Plan/s 
Sponsored by the Company 
   
Defined Benefit Plan 21 47* 68 
Defined Contribution Plan 1 33  34 
Total 
 
22 80 102 
 χ2 = 10.46,  p = 0.001 
 
*   Includes the 10 companies which disclosed they sponsor DBPs but did not disclose sufficient information to include in 
the sample to test H2 to H5.  Inclusion of these companies in the Chi-square test biases the test against finding a 
significant result.   
 
 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests on Explanatory Variables for the Decision to 
Lobby or Not Lobby on the ED 53 Proposals 
 
  Lobbying (L) 
(N = 21) 
Non-lobbying (NL) 
(N = 37) 
  
 
Variable 
 
Prediction 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mann-
Whitney  
Z-statistic 
Probability 
(one-tailed) 
        
INCVOL L > NL 21.11 
17.26 
 
1.41 
76.73 
10.96 
8.83 
 
1.86 
36.84 
2.484 0.007 
NETSUP L < NL 0.010 
0.013 
 
0.000 
0.058 
0.015 
0.021 
-0.000 
0.094 
-0.558 0.288 
LEV 
 
L > NL 0.583 
0.175 
 
0.306 
0.949 
0.487 
0.148 
 
0.265 
0.939 
2.027 
 
0.020 
 
 
SIZE L > NL 5,420 
5,415 
 
283 
19,124 
1,617 
1,389 
 
136 
4,941 
3.115 0.001 
INCVOL =  Standard deviation of earnings per share for 5 years from 1989 to 1993, 
NETSUP =  Net superannuation asset (liability) / Total assets, 
LEV  =  Total Liabilities / Total Assets, 
SIZE  =  Total sales (millions). 
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Table 5 
Logistic Analysis of the Decision to Lobby (n=21) or Not Lobby (n=37)  
on the ED 53 Proposals 
 
   
  L  =  β0  + β1 INCVOL + β2 SIZE  + β3 NETSUP + β4 LEV 
 
  Coefficients 
(asymptotic t-statistics) 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
 
INCVOL 
 
+ 
 
0.058 
(1.816)* 
 
SIZE 
 
+ 
 
0.001 
(2.112)* 
 
NETSUP 
 
- 
 
-8.791 
(-0.420) 
 
LEV 
 
+ 
 
0.248 
(0.094) 
 
Constant 
  
-2.426 
(-1.726)* 
 
Model Chi-Square 
  
19.81 
 
Significance 
  
0.001 
 
Percent Correctly Classified 
  
74.14 
 
Logistic Regression R2 #
  
0.261 
 
L  =  1 if lobbying, or 0 if non-lobbying, 
INCVOL =  Standard deviation of earnings per share for 5 years from 1989 to 1993, 
SIZE  =  Total sales ($ millions), 
NETSUP =  Net superannuation asset (liability) / Total assets, 
LEV  =  Total Liabilities / Total Assets. 
 
 *    Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
  #   The predictive measure of the logistic regression is based on the log likelihood.  The initial -2 log 
likelihood is analogous to the total sum of squares in linear regression, and the estimated -2 log likelihood 
is analogous to the residual sum of squares (Demaris, 1992).  Thus the pseudo R2 measure for logistic 
regression is: 
   (-2 Initial Log Likelihood) - (-2 Estimated Log Likelihood)
 R2  =   -2 Initial Log Likelihood 
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Table 6 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients (p-values*) for Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
 
INCVOL SIZE NETSUP LEV 
     
INCVOL 1.000 0.245 
(0.064) 
 
0.119 
(0.374) 
0.172 
(0.196) 
SIZE  1.000 
 
0.056 
(0.676) 
 
0.565 
(0.000) 
NETSUP   1.000 -0.123 
(0.358) 
 
LEV    1.000 
 
*  two-tailed probabilities 
INCVOL =  Standard deviation of earnings per share for 5 years from 1989 to 1993, 
SIZE  =  Total sales ($ millions), 
NETSUP =  Net superannuation asset (liability) / Total assets, 
LEV  =  Total Liabilities / Total Assets. 
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Appendix A  
 
Summary of Measurement, Recognition and Disclosure of Defined Benefit 
Superannuation Obligations under ED 53 and AASB 1028 
 
 ED53 proposals AASB 1028 requirements 
Measurement and 
Recognition: 
  
Superannuation asset/liability 
(Balance sheet) 
 
Difference between the present 
value of employees’ accrued 
benefits and the net market 
value of plan assets as at the 
employer’s reporting date 
 
None 
Superannuation expense 
(Profit and loss statement) 
Change in the superannuation 
asset/liability during the 
reporting period  
 
None 
Disclosure:  The following information 
which has been determined in 
accordance with AAS 25 
“Financial Reporting by 
Superannuation Plans” as at the 
date of the most recent financial 
report of the plan: 
 
Superannuation assets Description and corresponding 
amounts of the major classes of 
assets held in sponsored 
superannuation plans  
 
Net market value of plan assets  
Accrued benefits  None • Accrued benefits* 
• Vested benefits  
 
Net superannuation 
asset/liability 
• Aggregate defined benefit 
superannuation liabilities 
• The amount of assets (if 
any) recognised in relation 
to sponsored superannuation 
plans  
 
• Difference between accrued 
benefits and superannuation 
plan assets* 
• Any amounts recognised 
 
Superannuation expense Aggregate superannuation 
expense 
Any amounts recognised. 
 
* This amount may be at a value that was determined up to four years prior to the company’s reporting date, 
given that superannuation funds are not required to have actuarial valuations of accrued benefits conducted 
more frequently than every three years, and that a fund’s reporting date may differ from the company’s 
reporting date.   
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Appendix B   
Public Companies that Lobbied on ED 53 
 
 Company Name Industry 
* Amcor Ltd Paper & Packaging 
* Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd Banks & Finance 
* Australian Gas Light Company Miscellaneous Services 
 Bank of Queensland Ltd Banks & Finance 
 BP Australia Ltd Oil & Gas 
 Bridgestone Australia Ltd Miscellaneous Industrials 
* Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd Diversified Resources 
 BTR Nylex Ltd Diversified Industrials 
* Burns, Philp & Company Ltd Food & Household 
 Chemplex Australia Ltd Chemicals 
* Coles Myer Ltd Retail 
 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Banks & Finance 
* CSR Ltd Building Materials 
 Esso Australia Ltd Oil & Gas 
* Howard Smith Ltd Diversified Industrials 
* ICI Australia Ltd Chemicals 
* Leighton Holdings Ltd Developers & Contractors 
* Lend Lease Corporation Ltd Developers & Contractors 
* Mayne Nickless Ltd Transport 
* National Australia Bank Ltd Banks & Finance 
* News Corporation Ltd Media 
 Oakbridge Ltd Oil & Gas 
* Pacific Dunlop Ltd Diversified Industrials 
* Pancontinental Mining Ltd Diversified Resources 
* Pasminco Ltd (1996) Other Metals 
 Samuel Taylor Ltd Household Products 
* Santos Ltd Oil & Gas 
 Shell Australia Ltd Oil & Gas 
 Spotless Group Ltd Miscellaneous Services 
 Thomas Cook Ltd Travel / Financial Services 
* Western Mining Corporation Holdings Ltd Other Metals 
* Westpac Banking Corporation Banks & Finance 
* Woodside Petroleum Ltd Oil & Gas 
   
* Included in the sample of 21 lobbying companies used to test for differences between lobbying and non-
lobbying companies 
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Appendix C  
Institutional Differences Between Australia and the U.S.43
Table C.1 summarises the major institutional differences between Australian and U.S. 
superannuation/pension funds in relation to both their nature and the regulatory environments 
in which they operate.   
The Australian and U.S. regulatory frameworks governing superannuation/pensions vary 
greatly in both scope and maturity.  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
has been in effect in the U.S. for almost a quarter of a century.  Together with the 15 
additional statutes that amended the Act during the 20 years following enactment, ERISA 
comprises a complex set of standards for disclosure, funding, fiduciary responsibility, 
vesting, plan terminations and enforcement (Langbert, 1996).  In contrast, Australian 
legislation was first introduced relatively recently with the enactment of the Occupational 
Superannuation Standards Act in 1987, which was superseded by the Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) Act (SIS) in 1993.  The SIS Act applies to all superannuation entities 
(including DCPs) in both the public and private sectors, with a relatively small number of 
provisions applying exclusively to DBPs.   
The most significant difference between the regulations of the two countries is the statutory 
requirement in the U.S. for insurance administered by the Pension Benefits Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), to guarantee the benefits of DBPs that are terminated with insufficient 
assets to pay the pensions promised to members (OECD, 1993).  ERISA empowers the 
PBGC to secure a lien of up to 30 percent of the net worth of a firm terminating an 
underfunded pension plan (Stone, 1982).  In contrast, the Australian Government has adopted 
a market-oriented approach to prudential supervision of superannuation funds, with minimum 
commercial interference.  Accordingly, the prudential measures under SIS are designed to 
enhance security of superannuation benefits, not guarantee them (Roberts and Larkin, 1994).   
Minimum benefits44 must be fully funded in Australian DBPs, otherwise the plan is deemed 
to be technically insolvent, and the trustees must immediately initiate a program to return the 
fund to solvency or wind-up the fund (SIS reg. 9.17).  On the other hand, underfunded DBPs 
in the U.S. are permitted to continue to operate, although if a plan fails to meet minimum 
funding requirements under ERISA, a penalty tax is imposed on the employer on the funding 
deficiency (Williams, 1998). The SIS legislation does not impose any requirements on the 
employer to fund promised defined benefits, or penalise the employer for failing to do so.  
Thus, ERISA confirmed the existence of a liability of the employer-sponsor, making annual 
funding payments mandatory (Dimian & Kahlbaugh, 1992), while on the contrary, Australian 
legislation does not compel employer-sponsors to fund a DBP.  Also, the U.S. legislation 
establishes a statutory claim on the employer-sponsor entity’s assets if the DBP is 
underfunded, whereas Australian DBPs do not have such financial protection. 
A significant difference in the operations of DBPs in the two countries is the requirement for 
U.S. pension plans to have an annual actuarial valuation of accrued benefits (Williams, 
                                                 
43  This summary is drawn from Gallery (1999).   
44  The SIS legislation requires that, as a minimum, benefits comprising employee contributions and mandatory 
employer contributions immediately vest in members.  Mandatory contributions by employers are required to 
provide minimum superannuation support under the Superannuation Guarantee (SG) legislation, which was 
enacted in 1992.  The amount is calculated as a percentage of employees’ salaries, with a rate of 7% applying 
for the 1998-99 financial year.  Plan trust deeds determine vesting of any further portion of accrued benefits 
above these minimum statutory requirements. Thus, for accounting purposes, the amount of vested benefits may 
differ from that determined by the SIS legislation.   
 36
1998), while the frequency for Australian plans is at least every three years (SIS reg. 9.29).  
This means that the surplus or deficit for Australian plans can be determined only every three 
years if they opt for triennial valuations.  Furthermore, in the U.S., SFAS 35 (para. 7) 
requires accrued benefits to be presented as of the same date as the plan’s net assets available 
for benefits, enabling the determination of the plan’s funding position at reporting date.45  
The equivalent Australian accounting standard (AAS 25) does not specify timing of actuarial 
valuations, thus the plan’s net position may be determined at a date other than the plan’s46 or 
employer’s balance date.  Also, in the U.S. SFAS 87 (para. 52) specifies that both plan assets 
and accrued benefits must be measured at the plan’s sponsoring employer’s balance date, or 
at a date no more than three months prior to balance date; there are no equivalent 
requirements in Australia.  
Another difference is that private sector superannuation plans in Australia are usually fully 
funded (SSCS, 1992), which is probably due to a combination of factors, including the 
legislative restrictions on underfunding.  In contrast, underfunding in the U.S. is common47, 
with the PBGC reporting that at the end of 1995, underfunding of company plans totalled $65 
billion (Laboul, 1998).  A further difference between the two countries is how the benefit is 
funded.  In Australia, DBPs are typically contributory (both employees and employers 
contribute to the plan), whereas in the U.S. employees generally do not contribute to the plan 
(SSCS, 1991).  Australian and U.S. DBPs also differ in their governance structure; SIS (s.89) 
requires equal numbers of employer and member representatives on funds’ trustee boards, 
whereas in the U.S., fund trustees are usually appointed by the employer (Laboul, 1998).    
                                                 
45 If the actuarial present value of accrued benefits is not available or cannot be reasonably determined for the 
end of the reporting year, then it should be presented as of the beginning of the year, but all other information 
must be for the same period, i.e. in comparative form (Williams, 1998).   
46 DBPs that voluntarily use the reporting format that recognises accrued benefits on the face of the financial 
statements are an exception.  Under AAS 25 this optional reporting format is available only to DBPs that 
measure accrued benefits at the end of each reporting period.   
47 Schroeder (1993) reports that 15% of U.S. plans were underfunded in 1993.   
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Table C.1 
Comparison of Institutional Settings of Australian and U.S. Defined Benefit Plans 
 
Feature Australia U.S. 
Legislation and year of 
enactment  
Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993  
(superceded the Occupational 
Superannuation Standards Act 
1987)  
Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act 1974  
Plus 15 additional statutes 
enacted over the next 30 years.   
Statutory insurance 
guaranteeing benefits of 
underfunded DBPs that are 
terminated    
No Yes  - provided through Pension 
Benefits Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) 
Minimum funding requirements Technically insolvent under SIS 
if fund assets do not at least 
cover employee contributions 
and mandatory employer 
contributions – trustees must 
institute program to fund these 
benefits or terminate the plan.   
Minimum funding requirements 
apply under ERISA – if plan is 
underfunded a penalty tax is 
imposed on the employer for the 
funding deficiency.   
Funding status  Generally fully funded Underfunding is common.  
Frequency of actuarial 
valuations required by 
regulation  
At least triennially  At least annually  
Date at which accrued benefits 
must be determined for 
reporting purposes.   
Not specified by legislation or 
accounting standards  
SFAS 35 requires that accrued 
benefits are presented as of the 
same date as plan assets are 
reported and SFAS 87 requires 
that plan obligations are 
measured at a date no more than 
3 months prior to the company’s 
reporting date 
Funding arrangements  Generally contributory  
(both employers and employees 
contribute) 
Generally non-contributory  
(only employers contribute) 
Fund governance structure SIS requires equal numbers of 
employer and member 
representatives on a 
superannuation fund’s board of 
trustees.   
Pension plan trustees are usually 
appointed by the employer  
 
 
